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A person is said to prefer in the stochastic dominance sense one lottery over outcomes
over another lotter over outcomes if the probability of his (at least) first choice
being selected in the first lottery is greater than or equal to the analogous probability
in the second lottery, the probability of his at least second choice being selected in
the first lottery is greater than or euqal to the analogous probability in the second
lottery, and so on, with at least one strict inequality. This (partial) preference
relation is used to define straightforwardness of a social choice function that maps
profiles of ordinal preferences into lotteries over outcomes. Given a prior probability
distribution on profiles this partial preference ordering (taking into account the
additional randomness) is used to induce a partial preference ordering over social
choice functions for each individual. These are used in turn to define ex ante Pareto
undominated (efficient) social choice functions. The main result is that it is impossible
for a social choice function to be both ex ante efficient and straightforward. We also
extend the result to cardinal preferences and expected utility evaluations.
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I. Introduction
The Arrowian social choice problem consists of constructing
a "nice" mapping (constitution) which associates to every configuration
of individual preferences over a set of alternatives (profile) a social
preference ordering over the same set of alternatives. Within this
framework there is an analogous problem with which we deal, that of con-
structing a mapping (social choice function) which associates to every
profile an outcome rather than a preference ordering. One particularly
nice property that we would like in a social choice function, is that if
an individual is required to supply information about his preferences
in order to effectuate the social choice function, misrepresenting his
preferences will not be to his advantage. This emphasis in examining
the strategic considerations in implementing a social choice function is
due to Farquharson [1969]. Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite- [1975] proved
that in general any social choice function which is not dictatorial is
manipulable, i.e., for some profiles misrepresentation of some agent's
preferences will be to his benefit. If we allow lotteries over alterna-
tions to be assigned by social choice functions, the above result breaks
down. Consider the social choice function which assigns to every profile
which assigns equal probability to each person's first choice. This system
is neither dictatorial nor manipulable.
This system has a further property which was one of the desid-
eratar postulated by Arrow for the deterministic social welfare function
framework. That is, given a profile, an alternative selected by this
procedure (including the resolution of the lottery) is not unanimously
dominated by any other alternative. In the usual terminology this should
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be called ex post Pareto efficiency, which does not in general imply ex
ante efficiency. When we speak of ex ante efficiency of a constitution
or social choice function which is applicable to all profiles (Arrow's
postulate of unrestricted domain), we mean not before the resolution of
the lottery but before the profile itself is known. Hence, the distinc-
tion between ex post and ex ante efficiency in social choice is not restricted
to randomized procedures, but applies to the deterministic framework
as well. Arrow's justification of the postulate of unrestricted domain
is precisely that the decision making process should be applicable to all
possible profiles since when we choose it, we don't know to which profiles
it will be applied.
Arrow's Pareto principle, which is ex post, should be implied by
a reasonable notion of ex ante efficiency. Thus we are suggesting that
ex post efficiency is necessary but not sufficient as a proper concept
of efficiency of a constitution. Since Arrow proved an impossibility
theorem, the use of the weaker condition leads in fact to a stronger result.
Our main aim is to show the incompatibility of straightforwardness
and efficiency when lotteries are permitted. Since, as mentioned earlier,
the random dictator random choice function is both straightforward and
ex post efficient, we must use the stronger notion of ex ante efficiency.
One of the contributions of this paper is to introduce a very weak notion
of ex ante efficiency, one which can be applied to the ordinal framework.
This notion is that of comparison by stochastic dominance and is the
subject of the next section. We should note that this basis of comparison
circumvents the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility. In the
following section we use the same technique of stochastic dominance to
-3-
define straightforwardness and prove the main impossibility theorem. In
the last section we discuss cardinal preferences and show that the main
result carries over to the cardinal structure.
in
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II. Stochastic Dominance and Pareto Efficiency
There is a fixed finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives
A. A is the set of probability distributions (or lotteries) over A.
We identify A with the subset of A of degenerate probability distribu-
tions. N denotes the nonempty finite set of persons each of whom has a
complete, transitive, asymmetric binary (preference) relation P over A.
P is the set of all such relations and P is the set of all N-lists of
preference relations. We will generally call these N-lists profiles
and denote a profile by P_ = (P.). N » S will be the (nonempty) strategy
set common to all persons. A random outcome function (ROF) is a function
N " N
f : S -* A. An element in S will be called a selection and denoted
j3 = (s.). . As usual a choice function is a mapping from profiles to
outcomes. We will be concerned with random choice functions (RCF) which
~N
take profiles to random variables over outcomes, F: P ->• A.
In a deterministic framework a (deterministic) choice function
~N
f : P -*- A is said to be Pareto efficient (PE) is for every profile
-N
P_ e P , F(P) is Pareto efficient in A in the usual sense with respect to
P, i.e., for any a e A: [(3 ieN such that aPiF(P)) => (3 jeN such that
F(P) P.a)]. In other words the usual definition of efficiency first
defines efficiency of an outcome at a profile and then a choice function
is called efficient if it is efficient for all profiles. This concept is
the one introduced into social choice theory by Arrow [1963] and is con-
sistent with the notion of Pareto efficiency in the Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function and Hurwicz ' s [197 2] notion of non-wastefulness
of allocation mechanisms.
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But consider the design of a social choice function which is
to be applied to many situations (i.e., profiles) or to unknown situa-
tions (because preferences are fundamentally unknown to a planner) . In
this case this notion of pointwise efficiency seems a necessary but not
sufficient criterion of efficiency to apply to choice functions. This
implicit stochastic nature of the profile was generally disregarded in
the deterministic choice function framework. However, when randomness
enters in the choice function (i.e., an "outcome" associated with a
specific profile is a random variable) one must use stochastic considera-
tions in the welfare evaluation of the choice function. It then becomes
compelling to consider not only the stochastic nature of the outcome for
a specific profile but the stochastic nature of the profiles themselves.
Formally we assume there is a list of probability distribution
over profiles, one for each person. We assume that the support of each
distribution is the entire set of profiles and we make a symmetry across
persons assumption . Specifically we assume that if a profile is obtained
from another profile by a permutation of persons, then the probabilities
of the profiles are equal. We also restrict our attention to symmetric
(across persons) choice and outcome functions . That is for an RCF
F, F(P) = F(P') whenever P_' is a permutation (across people) of JP;
analogously for random outcome functions. While the assumption of
symmetric priors is essential for our main result, the symmetry assump-
tion on RCF's is for expository purposes only. We will comment further
on this at the end of section three.
We will now make explicit our notion of efficiency of an RCF.
Consider two RCFs, F and F' . F is said to Pareto dominate F' if each
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person prefers F to F' taking into account the probability distribution
over the outcomes for each profile as well as his probability distribu-
tion over profiles. We say that an RCF F is Pareto efficient if it is
not Pareto dominated by any RCF F'.
If jt is the list of the persons' probability distributions
over profiles, this domination relationship depends on ]r_. Thus the
Pareto efficiency should properly be called T[-Pareto efficiency. We will
never be considering two different lists of probability distributions
over profiles simultaneously; hence we will refer only to Pareto efficiency
and omit ir_.
What has been left unstated until now is how a person compares
two RCFs, given his probability distribution ir over profiles. Since the
profiles are of ordinal preferences (i.e., in any realization of n a
person expects to have ordinal preferences over the outcomes) stochastic
dominance will be the proper tool in comparing RCFs. As mentioned in the
introduction expected utility as a tool for comparison will be treated in
the sequel (after introducing a notion of cardinal profiles).
We remind the reader that given two k-lists of numbers (in our
i k i k
case probability distributions) q = (q )•_-,» r = (r ) ._. we say that q
i i i i
stochastically dominates r if for all j = 1, ..., k E. q > E~ . r
with equality for j = k and at least one strict inequality. We will
denote this relation by q SD r. An RCF F and a probability distribution
i k i
over profiles induce a k-list q = (q ) . , where k = itA and q is the
probability of a person's i ranked alternative being chosen. Given
two RCFs, F and F', it is these induced probability vectors which are
compared via stochastic dominance to determine the ranking of F and F*.
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We will write FSDF' [or FSD(tt)F'] if the corresponding probability
vectors, q and r, stand in this relation. When we consider x, y eA
we write x SD y if the induced probability vectors q and q stand in
the same relation.
To illustrate this concept we will compare two RCFs, F and G,
with three persons and three alternatives. F is the random dictator;
for any profile P_, F(P) is the probability distribution over A which
assigns probability 1/3 to each person's first choice. G is the simple
majority RCF with a tie breaking rule of assigning probability 1/3 to
each alternative in the cyclic profiles. Each person's probability
distribution over profiles is uniform.
We will now calculate the probability vector q induced by F.
Let us consider any person, say 1. The probability that he is the random
dictator is 1/3 and in this case he surely gets his first choice. The
probability that the second person is the random dictator times the
probability that the second peron's first choice coincides with that of
1 is 1/3*1/3 = 1/9. Similarly the probability that the third person is
the random dictator and that his first choice coincides that of 1 is 1/9.
Thus q , the probability that 1 receives his first choice is
1/3 + 1/9 + 1/9 = 5/9. If person 1 is the random dictator he will not
receive his second choice. If 2 (or 3) is the random dictator, the -
probability that l's second choice is the first choice of 2 (or 3) is
1/3. Thus q
2
= 1/3-1/3 .+ 1/3-1/3 - 2/9. Similarly q
3
= 2/9.
Next we will calculate the probability vector r induced by G.
Person l's top ranking alternative can be chosen either as a majority
winner or under the tie-breaking rules. The probability of a tie, i.e.,
of a cyclic profile is 1/18: In that case the probability of l's top
ranked alternative being chosen is 1/3. In the case of a majority winner
there is probability 1/9 of a unanimous first choice. There is probability
2/3 that exactly two persons have the same first choice and probability
2/3 that one of them is person 1.
The probability that the first choices of all three persons are
distinct is 2/9. Included in these profiles are the cyclic profiles
which have probability 1/18. Thus the probability is 3/18 that all
three persons have distinct first choices and there is a majority winner.
Hence the probability that l's first choice is chosen in this case is
1/3*3/18 = 1/18. Summing r1 = 1/3*1/18 + 1/9 + 2/3-2/3 + 1/18 = 34/54.
The probability that l's third choice is chosen is 1/3*1/18
under the tie-breaking rule and 1/9 if there is a majority winner (this
can occur only if persons 2 and 3 have l's third ranked alternative as
3
their common top ranked alternative). Thus r = 1/3*1/18 + 1/9 = 7/54;
2 2hence r 13/54. The conscientious reader will compute r directly to
verify this. It is clear that r stochastically dominar.es q, hence for
each person G SD F, i.e., G Pareto dominates F.
The relative inefficiency of the random dictator compared to
majority rule can be seen clearly by examining the following profile
(and permutations of this profile across people) . The columns represent




If we look only at the top ranked alternatives the random dictator seems
perfectly reasonable. But looking at the entire preference profile, and
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if a person takes into account that he is equally likely to be in any
position in the profile he should favor x over z or y . Majority rule
takes these considerations into account and the notion of stochastic
dominance captures the advantage of majority fule over random dictator
for such profiles without needing any cardinality of the preferences.
It should be noted that for this example (i.e., 3 persons, 3 alternatives)
the fact that majority fule Pareto dominates the random dictator does not
depend on their being a common prior probability distribution. The result
holds regardless of the persons' probability distributions so long as they
satisfy our symmetry assumption. The discussion which follows examines
this phenomenon more fully.
If we observe, as in the profile above, that an RCF F is
"inefficient" on a specific subset of profiles, it must be dominated.
-N
To formalize this consider a set of profiles r c P where P is closed
under permutations across persons. That is if P_eT and P_' is a permuta-
tion across persons of P_, then P'eT. We refer to such a set as a
symmetric subset of profiles . We say that an RCF F stochastically
dominates an RCF G on T if F SDO) G where
<f>
= ir/r, i.e., $ is 7r condi-
tioned on T. If r is the symmetric span of a single profile, then $ is
identical for all persons due to the assumed symmetry of each person's
probability distribution over P .
Lemma : Given an RCF F and a symmetric subset of profiles T,
if F is stochastically dominated on T, then F is stochastically dominated.
Proof : Suppose F is stochastically dominated by G on T. Define
a new RCF H such that H(P) = F(P) for P ^ T and H(P) = G(P) for PeT. We
-10-
will show that H SD F. Let us denote by q the probability distribution
induced by F and tt , i.e., q is the probability under tt that a person's
i ranked alternative is chosen by F. Similarly denote by r the distri-
bution induced by H and it, by s the distribution induced by F and ir|r,
by t the distribution induced by G and tt\T
,
and finally by v the distri-
bution induced by F and tt](P NT). Thus the distribution induced by H
and tt, r satisfies
r = tt(P
N\J) v + Tf(r)t
and similarly
q = ir(P
N\r) v + Jf(r)s
Note that by hypothesis t SD s. The lemma then follows from the follow-
ing two obvious claims.
Claim 1 : For any two vectors a and b and a positive number
a: a SD b <=5>- aa SD ctb
.
Claim 2 : For any three vectors a, b and c: a SD b <=> a + c SD b + c.
Q.E.D.
The claims in effect say that the relation SD over vectors is invariant
under positive linear transformations.
We made the assumption of positive probability of each profile
to make the conditional probabilities well defined and consistent with
claims 1 and 2. The symmetry of T was used to guarantee that the RCF H
is symmetric across persons.
-li-
lt should be noted that a simple corollary of this lemma is
that if an RCF is Pareto dominated on a symmetric set of profiles, then
it is Pareto dominated. The only restriction on the probability dis-
tributions over profiles of different persons is that of symmetry and
positivity
.
j- The converse of the lemma is false. That is, an RCF F which
~N
is undominated on every component of some partition of P into symmetric
~N
subsets may be dominated on P* . To see this we present the following
example.
Let T and 7 be the symmetric spans (across persons) of the
following profiles
'2
x x z y
z z y z






By the symmetric span of a- profile we mean all the profiles obtained from
it by permutations across persons. Let F be an RCF which chooses x for
any prbfile in r..
, y for any profile in r„ and is undominated on the set
of all other profiles. We see that F is undominated on r and r„ as
well. For instance, q on r is (1/2, 0, 1/2) and there is no otherx x.
random outcome which gives as high a probability of getting a person's first
choice. In a similar manner choosing y for profiles in T„ maximizes the
probability of having a person's first or second choice, hence is
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undominated. But q on T U T is (1/2, 3/8, 1/8) whereas F on T U T
induces the vector 1/2(1/2, 0, 1/2) + 1/2(1/4, 3/4, 0) = (3/8, 3/8, 1/4).
Thus we see that an RCF G which chooses z on V U r_ and coincides with
F off T
1
U r_ stochastically dominates F.
This same example shows clearly how the Pareto dominance rela-
tion on RCFs depends on the probability distribution ir over profiles. In
the above example if tj(T ? )/^(T ) is nearly zero or infinity, q would not
stochastically dominate the probability weighted average of q and q .
Another example which will be used to prove a main result
involves the symmetric span of the following four person, four alternative
profile.
x y z w
(*) y x
x y
z w y z
w z w x
For this set of profiles if y is chosen the conditional (on
this set of profiles) probability vector induced is q = (1/4, 2/4, 1/4, 0).
Similarly if x is chosen the vector induced is q = (1/4, 1/2, 0, 1/4),
if z is chosen the induced is q = (1/4, 0, 2/4, 1/4), and if w is chosen
the induced vector is q = (1/4, 0, 1/4, 2/4). We see that q stochastically
dominates each of the vectors q , q and q. Thus it is clear that q
dominates any other vector which is induced by a random outcome which
assigns positive probability to any alternative other than y. Hence by
the lemma any undominated RCF must choose the alternative y for this sub-
set of profiles.
Examination of these examples suggests how one might construct
an undominated RCF for any number of persons and alternatives. In
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particular suppose one defines an RCF such that for the symmetric span
of any profile the outcome chosen for this subset of profiles induced a
vector probabilities which maximizes the probability of a person getting
his first choice and subject to this condition maximizes the probability
of a person getting his second choice, and so on. This leads us to the
plurality (or lexicographic pluralility) choice function which is
formalized as follows:
Theorem : Given a profile P e P let F(P) be the lottery which assigns
equal probability to each alternative in
B = {xeA|VyeA: [( i s.t. m (y) > m.(x)) =*- ( j < i s.t. m.(y) < ra.(x))]}
j_t_
where m, (z) is the number of persons for whom z is the k ranked alter-
native in P. Then F is (Pareto) stochastically undominated.
Proof : Consider any person. We remind the reader that his underlying
probability distribution over profiles tj is symmetric across persons.
Suppose that there is an RCF G which stochastically dominates F. Let q
and r be the probability vectors induced by F and G, respectively. If









. Thus rk > q
k
. Let (T-K . be the partition of PN1=1 i=l i \ 6 / 6eA ^
such that each r~ is the symmetric span of a single profile.






6 E A ^V r 6
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where q, is the probability vector induced by F on the symmetric span
T-. Similarly r. is the probability vector induced by G on the
symmetric span I*. . Consider the first i, say e, such that for some
6eA, q r =f r . . We will show that the inequality must be of the form
6 o
e e
q~ > r . By the decomposition of q and r the last inequality and the
equality for all lower indices implies that q = r for i < e and
q > r . This is a contradiction to the negation assumption that
G SD F, i.e., r SD q.
The above inequality is a simple consequence of the defini-
tion of lexicographic plurality. Indeed, F and G are each constant on
every T, (since by assumption we are treating only symmetric choice
functions). If q.
=f r * anc^ ILe ^x> G(P)eA is not a probability distribu-
tion over B (it is clear that B as in the statement of the theorem is
identical for all P in a fixed T,.). This is because if x, y e B,
<1
= q = I* • Thus G(P) must assign positive probability to some z X B.
For any z i B and any x e B for the first i such that m.(z) / m (x)
m. (z) < m.(x). Or equivalently q < q . Since r. is the vector of
probabilities induced by G(P) with support not included in B, for the
i such r.
=f q and r < q^.
Since this must hold for each person, the result obtains.
Q.E.I>.
We end this section by observing that the theorem above illustrates
how one could construct other undominated RCFs. Lexicographic plurality
maximizes the partial sums in the lexicographic order. However, we can
get a stochastically undominated vector if we maximize the partial sums
15-
in any order, if j , ..., j is a permutation of 1, ..., k maximize
the sum of the first i, coordinates, then maximize the sum of theJ l
first j? coordinates subject to the first maximization, and so on.
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III. Straightforwardness in the Sense of Stochastic Dominance
We turn our attention now to the implementation of an RCF. By
the implementation of an RCF we mean the design of an ROF and a solution
concept, so that for every profile the resulting solution is precisely
that random outcome which was prescribed by the RCF. Our goal here is
to examine the possibility of implementation where the solution concept
N
-Nis dominant strategy equilibria. Given an ROF f : S -> A and a P_ e P
a selection s* = (s*) . is said to be dominant strategy equilibrium
if for all jeN and s_ = (s.)- N > f(s) does not stochastically dominate
f((s ) i., s*) . As usual the ROF f is said to be straightforward (in
the stochastic dominance sense) if there exists a dominant strategy equal
for each profile. The plausibility of dominant strategy equilibria and
straightforward outcome functions is well known (see Farquharson [1969]
or Gibbard [1973]). A main difference between their treatment of
straightforwardness and ours is that they restrict comparisons to deter-
ministic outcomes using the preferences P. while we allow comparisons of
random outcomes, still using the preferences P. on A. Clearly the
stochastic dominance relation restricted to A (relative to P.) coincides
with P.. Since the SD relation over A is not complete, for a given
profile we may have that there are not only multiple dominant strategy
equilibria but non-unique equilibrium outcomes as well. Given an RCF F
we say that an ROF f implements F if for all P e P F(P) e {f(s_)|s. is a
dominant strategy equilibrium for P} . If we construct a mapping w: P * S
such that w(P) e {s_|s_ is a dominant strategy equilibrium and f(s) = F(P)}
the composition of f and w is a straightforward ROF with preference rela-
tions as strategies which implements F and furthermore, this composition
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as a function from the set of profiles into outcomes coincides with F.
Thus if an RCF F can be implemented at all it can be implemented by
itself (as an ROF where the strategies are the individual preferences).
An example of an RCF which is straightforward (i.e., imple-
mented by itself) is that of majority rule with a special tie-breaking
rule.
~N
Theorem : Given a profile _P e P with #N odd let F(P) be the lottery
which assigns probability 1 to alternative x if x is a majority winner
and F(P) be the lottery which assigns equal probability to all outcomes
if there is no majority winner. Then F is straightforward.
Proof : We consider first the case where there is a majority winner x
for a profile P_. Consider an individual j. Suppose by change of strategy,
i.e., misrepresentation of his preferences, he can change the outcome.
Then the new outcome is either a new majority winner or the
uniform probability over alternatives. If there is a new majority winner
y we see that with his correct preferences a majority prefers x to y and
with his revised preferences a majority prefers y to x. Hence the j
person must have preferred x to y in his true preferences.
If there is not a new majority winner we note that the uniform
distribution over alternatives stochastically dominates the outcome x
only if x is the last ranked alternative for j. Since x Is a majority
winner and if j voted against x with respect to all other alternatives he
cannot change the outcome. In conclusion, there is no other strategy
which leads to an outcome which stochastically dominates x for j.
Consider the case where there is no majority winner, i.e.,
F(P) is the uniform probability over outcomes. Note that no element
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in the range of F stochastically dominates the uniform distribution over
A except j's first ranked alternative. But if j voted for his first
ranked alternative against all other alternatives, we see that no
change in his preferences can lead to this first ranked alternative
being a majority winner. In conclusion j cannot beneficially manipulate
F at P.
Q.E.D.
In the theorem of the previous section we exhibited an RCF
which was Pareto undominated. In this section we have exhibited an RCF
which is straightforward. We note that if there are three people and
three alternatives these two RCFs coincide. Thus for three persons and
three alternatives the two desiderata are compatible. However, if there
are at least four people and at least four alternatives the two objectives
are no longer compatible.
Theorem : If #N > 3 and #A > 3 then there does not exist an RCF which is
simultaneously Pareto undominated and straightforward.
Proof : Consider T, the symmetric span of the following five person
four alternative profile:
(**)
Clearly, on T q stochastically dominates q , q , and q . Hence
y
J x w z
q stochastically dominates any outcome which assigns positive probability
to any alternative other than y. By the lemma of the previous section
any (Pareto) undominated RCF must assign y, the degenerate random outcome,
to the profiles in T.
X X y y w
y y X X z
w w z z y
z z w w X
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Now consider the symmetric span A of a profile which is
identical to the profile (**) except that the preference ordering for
the first person is (x w z y) instead of (x y w z). The induced probability
vectors for A are q = (2/5, 2/5, 0, 1/5), q = (2/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5),
x y
q = (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 2/5), q = (0, 1/5, 3/5, 1/5). Hence by the same
w z
argument above, an undominated RCF must assign x with probability one
to A.
We have thus shown what any undominated RCF must assign to the
profiles in r and A. But we see that this restriction is not compatible
with straightforwardness. If the first person in the profile (**)
announces the preference ordering (x w z y) instead of his correct
preferences (x y w z) he changes the outcome from y to x (which he
prefers to y according to his true preferences).
We will now show that efficiency and straightforwardness are
incompatible for any odd number of persons greater than 3 and any number
of alternatives greater than 3. Suppose we append to the profile (**)
equal numbers of persons with preference orderings (x y w z) and (y x z w)
.
Clearly the vectors q and q for the appended profile will still
stochastically dominate q and q . Because of the symmetry between x
and y in the appended preferences, the relation between q and q is also
unchanged. Thus for an undominated RCF, y must be chosen for the expanded
profile. Analogously if the first person's preferences are changed as
before the undominated RCF must assign x to the new profile hence as
before person 1 can beneficially misrepresent his preferences in the
appended (**) profile. To see the impossibility of obtaining an undominated
and straightforward RCF for a greater number of alternatives (still with
-20-
an odd number of persons > 3), consider extending the profile (**) by
listing additional alternatives below the original four alternatives
in each person's preference ordering. The above arguments showing the
possibility of misrepresentation by person one remain essentially
unchanged
.
To complete the proof we must deal with the case of an even
number of persons greater than 3. We call the reader's attention to the
four person, four alternative profile (*) in the previous section. It
is easy to verify that if an RCF is undominated person one can beneficially
misrepresent his preferences in the same manner as above. It is true not
only for the profile (*) but also when the profile is extended by adding
more alternatives or by adding pairs of persons.
Q.E.D.
As mentioned earlier, the symmetry assumption on RCFs and ROFs
is superfluous given the symmetry of the priors. In general, given any
non-symmetric ROF (or RCF) , there exists a symmetric ROF which induces
on the symmetric span of any profile an identical probability vector.
In particular, in the proof of the theorem we see that for the four
symmetric spans of each of the four profiles used (*, ** and their variants),
efficiency requires that the RCF will be constant. Constancy on a symmetric
span implies that the RCF is symmetric on that span.
There are hoi^ever, certain non-symmetric priors for which the
random dictator is not Pareto dominated. Since it is always straightforward,
we see why the assumed symmetric priors are essential to our result.
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must be chosen for any cardinal profile which Induces an ordinal profile
in this symmetric span if an RCCF is to be efficient.
Then for all the 4x4 matrices with alternatives, x, y, z, vj
which induce the ordinal profile. (*Q of section three, we. see tha,t the
unique efficient, symmetric RCCF must choose for each of these matrices
the degenerate random outcome which assigns probability 1 to outcome y.
Similarly for each of the ordinal profiles of section three in which
there was an outcome which stochastically dominated all other outcomes.
Thus once we note that the appropriate cardinal analog of the lemma in
section two is true, we see that the incompatibility of efficiency and
straightforwardness extends to RCCFs.
However, in the previous sentence we have glossed over precisely
N *
what is entailed in an RCCF being straightforward. Given an ROF f : S * A
and a cardinal profile (u(x,i))
. a strategy selection s* = (s*)
.
is said to be a cardinal dominant strategy equilibrium if for all j in N
and for all s e SN
,
u(-




N{j } ) ,
This is
nothing more than the requirement that person j 's expected utility is
maximized by choosing s* regardless of the strategies selected by others.
An ROF is cardinally straightforward if for almost every cardinal profile
there is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Analogous to the ordinal case,
if an RCCF can be implemented by a straightforward ROF, it can be imple-
mented by itself with preferences as strategies. In this way our impossi-
bility result holds for the cardinal case regardless of whether the
strategy spaces of the ROFs are finite or infinite.
In the case that we restrict ourselves to finite strategy
spaces for ROFs Gibbard [1978] showed that if an ROF was cardinally
-21-
IV. Some Comments on Extension to a Cardinal Framework
There are several ways to incorporate cardinality into social
choice models. In all of these approaches the basic notion is that when
a society is faced with a choice problem, each person has cardinal
preferences over the outcomes. We mean by a person's having cardinal
preferences his ability to choose between random outcomes via expected
utility. A cardinal profile is thus an #N x #A matrix each column of
which is the utility vector for an individual. A random cardinal choice
function (RCCF) maps the set of such matrices into A. In order to dis-
cuss the ex ante efficiency of RCCFs we assume as before that each indi-
vidual has a prior probability distribution over profiles. Here, of
course, the profiles are the matrices introduced above.
Since a person makes his evaluations via expected utility there
is now a single number which is the expected utility of an RCCF with
respect to his prior. Different persons may have different priors, thus
they may attach different values to an RCCF. As before, we will assume
symmetry of priors and support consisting of all matrices. Symmetry here
can be defined by restricting our attention to those measures which have
appropriate density functions or by introducing transformations of the
space of matrices into itself induced by permutations of columns. If
we are considering symmetric RCCFs (i.e., symmetry across permutations of
columns) we see that for each person there is a unique (up to indifference)
expected utility maximizing random outcome independent of his prior. Hence
there is a unique (again up to indifference) symmetric RCCF. Suppose for
the symmetric span of an ordinal profile there is an outcome which sto-
chastically dominates all other random outcomes. Then that outcome
-23-
straightforward, it was a convex combination of dictatorial ROFs and ROFs
with two element ranges. This result can be used to show the incompati-
bility of straightforwardness and efficiency in this special case. How-
ever, Zeckhauser [1973] noticed that you cannot expect efficiency with
outcome functions which have essentially fewer strategies than the number
of different environments (profiles) to which they are to be applied. We
point out that our impossibility theorem does not hinge on this difficulty
as we made no assumptions on the strategy spaces.
-24-
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